Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination by Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R.
American Economic Association
Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination
Author(s): R. Mark Isaac and Charles R. Plott
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jun., 1981), pp. 448-459
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1802791 .
Accessed: 20/02/2014 15:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Economic Review.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 15:29:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction 
Markets: An Experimental Examination 
By R. MARK ISAAC AND CHARLES R. PLOTT* 
Price ceilings and price floors are common 
in all market systems. The ancient Greeks 
and Hellenistic era Egyptians are known to 
have utilized price controls (see H. Michele, 
p. 272, and J. P. Levy, p. 41), and numerous 
public policy questions today involve them. 
Apparently for as long as price controls have 
existed, their effects have been debated. For 
example, Diocletion's favorable view of his 
price ceilings' was disputed by the religious 
philosopher, Lactantius, who charged that 
the policy led to "scarcity and... low grade 
articles" (p. 145). 
The standard partial-equilibrium theory 
about the effects of price controls, the theory 
which is subjected to so much criticism, does 
not seem to have changed since Leon Walras. 
It is applied widely to a variety of market 
institutional arrangements including auction 
markets uch as those studied below. If the 
demand schedule is downward sloping and if 
the supply schedule is increasing as shown in 
Figure 1, there should be an equilibrium 
price-quantity pair of ($.60, 20). Nonbinding 
price controls, such as a price ceiling at or 
above the equilibrium or a price floor below 
equilibrium, should have no effects on the 
market. If the controls are binding, such as a 
price ceiling at $.55 or a price floor at $.70, 
then the market achieves an inefficient price- 
quantity pair with the market price equaling 
the controlled price. 
However, in spite of its prominent textbook 
status, the applicability of the model is ques- 
tioned regularly.2 Criticisms range from 
complete rejections of economics to elaborate 
theories of collusion. As an example of the 
latter, consider the "focal point" hypothesis 
as found in F. M. Scherer (p. 352). Perhaps 
the price ceiling will act as a focal point. 
Sellers, by focusing on a nonbinding ceiling, 
may be able to tacitly collude to keep prices 
above the equilibrium. Thus, the otherwise 
nonbinding price ceiling can have an effect 
on prices. A similar theory can be advanced 
about the effects of price floors. For us the 
existence of this general controversy and the 
focal point hypothesis regarding the dynamic 
effects of price controls eemed sufficient to
justify a systematic examination of the sub- 
ject. 
The objectives of this study are to examine 
the applicability and/or accuracy of the 
textbook model as applied to laboratory auc- 
tion markets. Our hope is that by studying 
the implications of price controls in simple 
controlled settings, we will be in a better 
position to analyze more complicated markets 
which have been the traditional subjects of 
academic and scientific concern. The choice 
to study auction markets, asopposed to other 
forms of market institutions, reflected an 
attempt o maintain continuity with other 
experimental studies. Our results are not ex- 
actly what we expected and they probably 
raise more questions than they answer. 
*University of Arizona and California Institute of 
Technology, respectively. The financial support of the 
National Science Foundation and the Caltech Program 
for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowl- 
edged. We thank Julie Laherty for her comments on an 
earlier draft. 
'The following quotation is excerpted from Roman 
Civilization (pp. 464-66): 
In response to the needs of mankind itself, which 
appears to be praying for release, we have decided 
that maximum prices of articles for sale must be 
established. We have not set down fixed prices, for we 
do not deem it just to do this, since many provinces 
occasionally enjoy the fortune of welcome low 
prices.... 
It is our pleasure, therefore, that the prices listed in 
the subjoined schedule be held in observance in the 
whole of our Empire. And every person shall take 
note that the liberty to exceed them at will has been 
ended, but that the blessing of low prices has in no 
way been impaired in those places where supplies 
actually abound.... 
Emperor Diocletian, The Edict on Prices, A.D. 301 
2During the course of preparing this paper, we noted 
several heated local political discussions concerning "fair 
trading" of liquor products, rent ceilings, and wage 
floors for municipal employees. 
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TABLE 1 
Series I Series II Mixed 
No Experience Experience Experience 
Experiment Period Experiment Period Experiment Period 
No Controls I all III 1-3,7 II all 
VII 9 VIII 9 
IX 9-10 X 9-10 
XII 9-11 VI 7-11 
Controls at Price ceiling IV all 
Equilibrium at equilibrium V all 
Price floor 
at equilibrium VI 1-6 
Nonbinding Price ceiling 5$ III 4 
Controls above equilibrium VII 1-8 VIII 1-8 
Price floor 54 
below equilibrium IX 1-8 X 1-8 
Price ceiling 10? 
above equilibrium XI all 
Binding Price ceiling 10$ III 5-6 
Controls below equilibrium XII 1-8 VIII 10 
I. Experimental Design 
A total of twelve experimental sessions 
were conducted. These are listed in Table 1 
according to the subject's laboratory market 
experience and according to the price-control 
institution imposed. The instructions were 
those of Plott and Vernon Smith (Appendix, 
pp. 147-52) and Ross Miller, Plott, and 
Smith (Appendices, pp. 610-21) with a price 
ceiling (floor) provision added as indicated 
below. Participants inSeries I (recruited from 
Pasadena City College) had no previous ex- 
perience in laboratory markets. All par- 
ticipants in Series II (recruited from Caltech) 
had participated in at least one other labora- 
tory market with parameters differing from 
the experiments reported here. 
The laboratory design of each experimen- 
tal session consisted of an auction market 
with four buyers and four sellers. Preferences 
were induced following the theory of induced 
preference (see Smith; Plott). Buyers made 
money by buying from the sellers and re- 
selling to the experimenter according to 
prespecified terms. Likewise, sellers made 
money by buying from the experimenter at 
prespecified costs and reselling to the buyers. 
In addition, each individual received a five- 
cent trading commission. The value of the 
redemption values for each individual is indi- 
cated on Figure 1. 
Each market involved a series of "trading 
periods" in which market participants were 
free to buy and sell. The individual parame- 
ters were identical each period. By applica- 
tion of the theory of induced preference 
(and/or derived demand) the individual 
parameters become limit prices which can be 
"summed" in accord with competitive market 
theory to produce the demand and supply 
curves represented inFigure 1. These curves 
remained constant over all periods and, ex- 
cept for small shifts upward by a constant, 
indicated below, were the same across all 
experiments. 
Markets were organized as two-sided oral 
auction markets. All participants had free 
access to the market floor to make bids to 
buy (offers to sell) or to accept any outstand- 
ing offer (bid). Each bid canceled previous 
bids, and offers canceled previous offers. All 
ties were broken by random process. 
The institutions being examined are a series 
of price ceilings and price floors. Specifically, 
the following paragraph is an example of a 
price ceiling: "During this experiment, no 
bids or offers may be made or accepted at a 
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$1.10 EQUILIBRIUM PRICE 60? 
EQUILIBRIUM QUANTITY 5 
20 TRADES 
1.00 
3 
.90 7 
.80 5, 
3 
.70 5 X 7 
1, 3 index to Individual 
.60 5,7 Redemption Values 
I Buyers I and 2 
3 Buyers 3 and 4 
5 Sellers 5 and 6 
.50 4I 7 Sellers 7 and 8 
7 I .40 
.40 5 1,3 
.30 I 3 
5 I 
3 
7 
.20 
I 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
.10 , I , 
0 10 20 30 40 
UNITS 
FIGURE 1 
price greater than cents. Of course, you 
may still make or accept bids or offers at a 
price less than or equal to this amount." 
In general, our experiments can be divided 
into seven categories as follows (P 
maximum price, P =minimum price, PO 
competitive quili]3brium): 
(1) no price controls 
(2) & (3) price controls precisely at predicted 
equilibrium (F= PO; P= PO) 
(4) & (5) strictly nonbinding price controls 
(P>Po; P<Po) 
(6) & (7) strictly binding price controls (P< 
PO; P>PO). 
Not all categories were examined because of 
the expense and the nature of the evidence 
obtained from the experiments we did run 
(see Table 1). 
The results of the twelve experimental ses- 
sions are presented in the following section, 
with a particular emphasis upon the patterns 
which exhibit regularity, and upon the rela- 
tionship between these results and the ex- 
isting theoretical iterature. Additionally, we 
will consider the significance of our results 
for future research. 
We have focused the study on the follow- 
ing three aspects of market behavior: 
1) Price Levels and Market Volume: 
Price level refers to the average price of a 
contract during a period. Sometimes the 
range of prices during a period is referenced. 
Volume refers to the number of contracts 
during a period. 
2) Market Responses to Institutional 
Modifications: During the course of several 
experiments price controls were removed. 
Occasionally a control was added or changed 
(see Table 1). 
3) Efficiency: The efficiency index 
developed by Plott and Smith is used here. 
Markets are 100 percent efficient if and only 
if the total of subjects' profits and commis- 
sions is maximized during a trading period. 
The efficiency is the actual sum of subjects' 
profits and commissions divided by the theo- 
retical maximum of this sum. This measure is 
related to the maximum of consumer's plus 
producer's surplus. 
11. Experimental Results: Some Preliminary 
Conclusions 
We can report two major results and a 
conjecture. The results are: First, that market 
behavior under price controls is more closely 
approximated by the competitive model than 
by the focal point model; and secondly, that 
markets under price controls exhibit behav- 
ioral regularities which are not included in 
standard analyses and some of which cannot 
be explained by the "traditional" competitive 
model. Specifically, four such regularities 
were noted: (i) controls at the competitive 
equilibrium cause market prices to diverge 
from the competitive equilibrium; (ii) the 
removal of nonbinding controls induces 
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.20- 
~~~10o 10 20 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~EXPERIM ENT I 
O 10 20 30 40 FIGURE 2 
FIGURE 2 
changes in market prices; (iii) inefficiencies 
induced by binding controls are greater than 
those predicted by the standard application 
of consumer's surplus analysis. The amount 
of additional loss depends upon the method 
of resolving the rationing problem; and fi- 
nally, (iv) adjustment of prices when binding 
controls are removed appears to involve an 
initial discontinuity or "jump" rather than a 
continuous adjustment. The conjecture is that 
nonbinding controls act like a "buffer" which 
holds prices below (above) the "natural" 
market equilibrium in the case of price ceil- 
ings (floors). 
Since the two results can be easily dem- 
onstrated, we have organized the following 
subsections, which contain a more detailed 
examination of the data, in a manner which 
highlights the nature of the conjecture. First, 
we discuss the behavior of markets with no 
controls at all. It is here that the concept of a 
natural equilibrium (as opposed to the equi- 
librium point of the competitive model) is 
explored. The second and third subsections, 
respectively, address the results of experi- 
ments with nonbinding controls and binding 
controls. 
The experimental results are displayed in 
Figures 2 through 13. Shown in these figures 
are all contract prices arrayed according to 
the order (in time) in which the contract 
occurred. The dotted line always indicates 
the competitive model equilibrium price (in 
the absence of controls). During some ex- 
periments institutional changes were made, 
for example, a price control may have been 
removed or imposed. A double line separates 
the periods where institutional changes are 
initially imposed and the nature of the change 
is indicated on the figure. The equilibrium 
price, average prices, volume, and efficien- 
cies for each period are on the figures. 
A. No Price Controls 
Three experiments were conducted with 
no price controls at all. These are Experi- 
ments I, II, and III (periods 1, 2, 3, and 7) on 
Figures 2, 3, and 4. In addition, price con- 
trols were removed for selected periods in 
other experiments (see Table 1). 
Laboratory markets (including those ex- 
amined here), when organized as a "double 
oral auction"3 without price controls, invari- 
ably exhibit the following properties. These 
properties are important since they serve as 
standards against which the effects of price 
controls can be judged. (a) Efficiencies are 
high and approach 100 percent and stabilize 
3We refer specifically to those in which, as here, 
small trading commissions are paid. 
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$1.10 
AVE. PRICE 61.75 60.05 60.00 60.00 50.00 50.00 60.00 
VOLUME 20 20 20 20 16 16 20 
1.00 _ EFFICIENCY 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 93.6% 90.17% 100.0% 
.90 .90 
.80 .80 
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40 - .40 
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.20 - 
.10 , 2 , , EXPERIMENT Im 
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FIGURE 4 
once high efficiencies are achieved (i.e., above 
98 percent). (b) The variance of prices tends 
to diminish with replications of periods. (c) 
If there are many trades at prices other than 
the equilibrium, they tend to be on both 
sides of the equilibrium. (d) Average prices 
tend to stabilize near the competitive equi- 
librium price. 
Experiment III (Figure 4) dramatically 
demonstrates the frequently observed power 
of the competitive model. Prices converge 
almost immediately to the competitive price 
with zero variance and 100 percent effi- 
ciency. While subjects in this experiment did 
not know the market parameters, they had 
all had previous experience in laboratory 
markets. Subject experience is suspected to 
be a primary reason for the relatively rapid 
convergence and low variance of Experiment 
III relative to the other two no-control ex- 
periments (I and II). 
Sometimes markets have sellers (buyers) 
who are willing to sell (buy) units at prices 
considerably below (above) the equilibrium 
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price even though many trades occur at or 
above (below) equilibrium. These individu- 
als, who do not seem inclined to "hold out" 
for one of the better deals are called "rela- 
tively soft" sellers (buyers). In Experiment I
(Figure 2) notice that the first rade or two in 
every period is considerably above the other 
trades. All of these contracts involved the 
same "soft" buyer. In Experiment II (Figure 
3) notice that many low-priced contracts oc- 
cur at the beginning of each period. These all 
involved the same two soft sellers whose 
anxiousness to sell resulted in low contract 
prices. Exactly why this occurs is not known 
(in Experiment II, however, one of the soft 
sellers had no previous experience in labora- 
tory markets) but whatever the reason the 
behavior is usually "corrected" by the last 
few periods. It is important to notice, how- 
ever, that "softness" seems to affect neither 
the market efficiency (in all three experi- 
ments it is over 98 percent by the fifth period 
and increasing) nor the tendency for trades 
to occur on both sides of equilibrium. Prop- 
erties (a), (b), and (c) are exhibited in all 
three experiments. However, to the extent 
that the average prices diverge from the equi- 
librium of the competitive model, we need a 
concept of a natural equilibrium. The effects 
of price controls then must be gauged rela- 
tive to this natural tendency as opposed to 
the prediction of the competitive model. 
The major difficulty with supporting our 
buffer conjecture above can now be made 
clear. Indeed the soft trader problem is the 
reason the result is listed as a conjecture 
instead of a conclusion. If soft buyers or 
sellers exist, the average price may remain 
removed from the competitive equilibrium 
price. Thus the influence of price controls 
must be measured against this natural tend- 
ency rather than the equilibrium of the model. 
But the natural tendency cannot be known 
until the market operates and since the soft- 
ness of subjects may be modified by any 
market experience, the very act of observing 
the "natural equilibrium" which differs from 
that of the competitive model may cause it to 
change. Thus, there is currently no "fixed" 
measure against which the influence of price 
controls can be identified. 
Our initial experimental design was not 
constructed to deal with this difficulty. At 
best we are able to establish within our de- 
sign the plausibility of the buffer conjecture 
and identify certain properties of the buffer 
phenomenon if indeed it exists. 
B. Nonbinding Controls 
Nonbinding price controls existed in all or 
parts of eight of the twelve experimental 
markets. The first experiments, reported here 
as Experiment IV (Figure 5) and Experiment 
V (Figure 6), involved a price ceiling at the 
competitive equilibrium price and Experi- 
ment VI (Figure 7) involved a floor at the 
competitive equilibrium. The results from 
these three experiments led to additional ex- 
periments with nonbinding controls "near" 
the equilibrium price (Experiments VII-XI 
on Figures 8-12, respectively). These will be 
covered in order below. 
Two conclusions can be supported by a 
reference to all experiments with nonbinding 
controls. First, the market behavior under 
nonbinding price controls is more closely 
approximated by the competitive model than 
the focal point model advanced in the intro- 
duction. In no period of any experiment is 
the average market price closer to the price 
control than the competitive equilibrium 
price. When the ceiling is equal to the com- 
petitive equilibrium price, the average prices 
tend to diverge from the ceiling. When the 
nonbinding price control is not equal to the 
competitive equilibrium price, the average 
price (indeed the entire range of prices) of 
every period is closer to the competitive qui- 
librium. The rejection of the focal point 
model in favor of the competitive equi- 
librium model seems amply justified. 
The second conclusion, on the other hand, 
highlights a possible incompleteness in the 
traditional model. Removal of a nonbinding 
price control affects the price level. The ac- 
tion seems to "disequilibrate" the market. 
Nonbinding price controls are removed in 
Experiments VI- X (Figures 7-11, respec- 
tively). In every case the removal of the 
nonbinding control is followed by a move- 
ment in the average price. The only case 
where the spirit of this conclusion is violated 
is Experiment III, period 4 (Figure 4) in 
which the nonbinding control was added after 
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FIGURE 5 
the market had already converged and in- 
duced no changes at all in the level of prices. 
According to traditional models the equil- 
ibrating properties of markets depend only 
upon the magnitude of excess demand. Since 
the removal of nonbinding price controls 
does not affect he magnitude of excess de- 
mand, the traditional model cannot account 
for the resulting changes in the price level. 
Exactly how the traditional model must be 
supplemented is not clear. Perhaps the re- 
moval of controls makes available addition- 
al strategies to one side or the other, there- 
by giving differential dvantages. Perhaps 
any "announcement" in experimental mar- 
kets will cause "disequilibrations." Perhaps 
the change creates additional uncertainty, 
thereby encouraging additional search activ- 
ity by some participants and conservative or 
soft trading on the part of the others. Clearly, 
both additional theory and experiments are 
needed before the reasons for the phenome- 
non can be identified. 
We turn now to the conjecture, the "buffer 
hypothesis" by examining first the experi- 
ments with price controls placed at the com- 
petitive quilibrium (Experiments IV-VI on 
Figures 5-7). In the price ceiling experi- 
ments, IV and V, prices are almost stabilized 
at an average below the ceiling with few 
trades at the competitive equilibrium ceil- 
ings. Efficiencies remain below 98 percent 
with marginal units not being traded even 
though in Experiment IV an efficiency of 
100 percent was attained once during an 
early period. In the price floor experiment, 
VI (with experienced subjects), prices con- 
verged to the floor in a manner seemingly 
contradictory to the buffer hypothesis, but 
when the floor was removed (period 7), prices 
immediately dropped to a lower level. Thus, 
in the context of the buffer hypothesis the 
natural equilibrium was below the competi- 
tive equilibrium for this group of subjects. 
Efficiencies in this experiment approximate 
100 percent. 
Four experiments (VII- X) were con- 
ducted with nonbinding controls placed 
within five cents of the competitive equi- 
librium. The buffer hypothesis can be ap- 
plied to all four sessions. The evidence is 
strongest for Experiments VII- IX where 
trades eldom if ever occur at prices between 
the price control and the competitive equi- 
librium. When the control is removed, prices 
immediately rise (fall) to above (below) the 
competitive equilibrium in the case of price 
ceilings (floor). In Experiments VII and IX 
the efficiency level did not behave in the 
stable manner characteristic of markets 
without controls. Instead, the efficiency 
sometimes attained the 98 percent level but 
did not remain. Experiment X differs be- 
cause prices converged initially below the 
competitive quilibrium but even in this 
experiment prices fell when the nonbinding 
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floor was removed. Thus, for this experiment 
application of the buffer hypothesis must 
assume that the sellers were soft and the 
nonbinding floor acted to hold prices above 
the natural equilibrium. 
In Experiment XI (Figure 12) a nonbind- 
ing ceiling was placed ten cents above the 
equilibrium. Since prices here converged very 
close to the competitive equilibrium and since 
the control remained throughout the whole 
experiment, we have little to say about it. We 
suspect, however, that the buffer effect is 
weak at best here where the control is "far" 
from the equilibrium price. 
As indicated above, we can at best specu- 
late about the reasons for the buffer effect. It 
may have something to do with the informa- 
tion and "search." The results of Experiment 
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III, period 4, were revealing in this respect. 
Adding a nonbinding ceiling there made no 
difference at all. 
C. Binding Price Controls 
For the first eight periods of Experiment 
XII (Figure 13) a price ceiling of fifty cents 
existed which was below the competitive 
equilibrium price of sixty cents. The ceiling 
was removed after the eighth period. In 
period 10 of Experiment VIII (Figure 9) and 
in periods 5 and 6 of Experiment III (Figure 
4) a price ceiling below the equilibrium was 
imposed. 
The experiments were motivated by the 
buffer hypothesis. Perhaps the buffer would 
work to keep prices below a binding control. 
In this respect he control could be viewed as 
the opposite of the focal point hypothesis a
introduced above. Perhaps the ceiling (floor) 
acts as a signal to the buyers (sellers) and 
helps them coordinate to hold prices below 
(above) the ceiling (floor). 
As can be seen from all the figures, this 
alternative hypothesis eems to be wrong. 
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Prices converge rapidly to the binding ceil- 
ings. Price equals the ceiling and the volume 
equals the competitive supply function 
evaluated at the price ceiling. For the case of 
binding controls the market price behaves as 
predicted by the traditional model. 
In the course of these experiments we dis- 
covered two modes of behavior we did not 
anticipate. The first "unexpected" results 
occurred when the controls were removed. 
The adjustment path of prices when the bind- 
ing ceiling is removed iffers somewhat from 
the standard dynamic hypothesis. In period 
9 of Experiment XII the binding price ceiling 
was removed. The mean price jumped im- 
mediately to more than thirteen cents above 
equilibrium and then converged own to- 
ward equilibrium rather than adjusting con- 
tinuously upward as suggested by most 
dynamics models. A discontinuity in adjust- 
ment was also present when a binding price 
ceiling was added in Experiment III (periods 
5 and 6) and then removed (period 7). In this 
market (in which subjects were experienced) 
prices simply adjusted back immediately to 
the previously attained equilibrium without 
"overshooting." This latter result suggests 
that information, i  addition to possibly the 
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magnitude of excess market demand, plays a 
systematic role in the formation of adjust- 
ment paths. Of course more experimentation 
and theory are necessary. 
Secondly, analysis of these experiments 
with binding controls reveals a source of 
inefficiency not often stressed in the econom- 
ics literature. Efficiency losses can result from 
both the price ceiling as well as the choice of 
the rationing process used in conjunction 
with binding price controls. Because of the 
fifty-cent price ceiling in Experiment XII, at 
most sixteen units may legally be offered for 
sale, yet effective demand at fifty cents is 
twenty-two units. The minimum possible loss 
of efficiency due to the price ceiling occurs 
when precisely the sixteen demand units with 
highest redemption value are traded. The 
maximum attainable efficiency under the 
price ceiling is 95.73 percent. Whether or not 
this maximum is attained depends upon the 
rationing process. In these xperiments a first 
come, first served method was used in which 
ties were broken by a random process. As 
can be seen on Figure 13, this rationing 
process induces its own inefficiencies. In ev- 
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ery period of Experiment XII efficiency is 
below the 95.73 percent. Naturally other 
methods of solving the allocation and queue- 
ing problem resulting from the price ceiling 
may have different efficiency properties. 
III. Summary 
In summary, we found the familiar partial- 
equilibrium model works remarkably well to 
describe laboratory auction market behavior 
in the presence of price controls and, particu- 
larly, when the price controls are strictly 
binding. However, we also discovered some 
empirical regularities which the traditional 
theory cannot explain. Nonbinding price 
controls seem to affect the average level of 
prices. Furthermore, price levels and market 
efficiency can be influenced by removing 
nonbinding controls. Exactly how the stan- 
dard model can be extended to explain these 
results is unclear. The crucial features of the 
institutions which induce the results have not 
been identified. Perhaps other institutions 
induce similar behavior. Perhaps many of 
our observations can be attributed to the 
single fact that institutions were changed and 
have nothing at all to do with the essential 
features of price controls. Nevertheless, the 
existence of empirical regularities eems un- 
deniable and we offer them as a challenge to 
theorists who are extending the standard 
models to include expectations, strategic be- 
havior, and/or the availability of market 
information to participants. 
Subject to qualifications that must accom- 
pany any application of laboratory experi- 
mental methods, the results presented here 
are of potential interest to the public policy 
analyst. Diocletion claimed that his price 
ceilings would have no effect in regions where 
they were not binding. These results suggest 
that he might have been wrong. The observa- 
tion that the price controls are not binding 
(in the sense used in partial-equilibrium 
analysis) is not sufficient o conclude that 
the controls are neutral either as to the con- 
duct of prices or to market efficiency. Con- 
versely, the fact that market transactions are 
occurring below a price ceiling or above a 
price floor will not be sufficient o conclude 
that removing controls will leave prices and 
quantities unchanged. 
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